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Social epistemology of scientific inquiry:  
beyond historical vs. philosophical case studies 
 
Introduction.  
I will discuss moving beyond case studies as a strategy for dealing with the problem of 
normative/descriptive dualism.  This is of course a quite general philosophical issue.  I 
am concerned specifically with the way normative/descriptive dualism polarizes the study 
of scientific inquiry into two mutually exclusive, yet co-dependent, projects: description 
of our actual scientific practices and their results, or abstract examination of epistemic 
ideals detached from our practices.  The split is most striking, and has occasioned the 
most controversy, with respect to social aspects of our knowledge-generating practices.
1
  
With respect to this issue, history and philosophy of science seem starkly opposed.  It 
seems we must choose between describing the historical unfolding of our scientific 
practices, or elaborating abstract epistemic ideals, when what is wanted is an account that 
includes both: epistemic ideals that apply to our practices.  I propose to resolve this 
dilemma, by explicating a conception of the epistemic ideal of scientific objectivity from 
the social aspects of our scientific practices.  This ideal of objectivity is both normative 
and engaged with the historical unfolding of experimental inquiry.  It thus bridges the gap 
between history and philosophy of science in the notoriously controversial field of social 
epistemology.  The way in which this solution moves beyond case studies may shed light 
on the relation between history and philosophy of science in other areas as well.   
 
The problem. 
The problem should first be set out a bit more precisely.  I presuppose that (1) the 
distinction between knowledge and opinion is a sine qua non of epistemology; (2) any 
adequate epistemology of scientific inquiry must explicate the distinction between 
scientific knowledge and opinion in a way that relates to our scientific practices; and (3) 
any adequate social epistemology of scientific inquiry must do so in a way that engages 
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significant social aspects of those practices.
2
  Normative and descriptive approaches to 
the social epistemology of scientific inquiry are prima facie incompatible.  On a 
thoroughly descriptive view, epistemic standards distinguishing knowledge from opinion 
are of a piece with our scientific practices.  There is no ‘absolute’ standard outside the 
historical contexts in which they emerge and (for a time) persist.
3
  Knowledge is 
distinguished from opinion in virtue of satisfying epistemic standards resulting from 
complex and highly contingent social negotiations.  As social structures, values and 
interests change over time, epistemic standards for scientific knowledge change in 
correlated ways.  Although they may be described, these changes cannot be epistemically 
evaluated.  Any standard for such evaluation would transcend the variable socio-
historical contexts in which our scientific practices occur.  But, on this view, there are 
none.  In contrast, normative epistemology (in the Anglophone analytic tradition) 
requires such standards: epistemic ideals that prescribe our practices independently of the 
historical course of scientific inquiry.
4
   
Normative/descriptive dualism effectively segregates history and philosophy of 
science, with respect to the social aspects of scientific inquiry.  On the descriptive 
approach, social epistemology of scientific inquiry is a form of historical investigation.  
On the normative approach, it is continuous with epistemology in the analytic tradition.  
So normative/descriptive dualism has significant consequences for the relation of history 
and philosophy of science in the emerging and contentious field of social epistemology, 
and in science studies more generally.  
Yet an adequate social epistemology of scientific inquiry needs both.  On a 
thoroughly descriptive approach, the distinction between scientific knowledge and what 
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 If an account fails to coherently explicate the distinction then it is outside the scope of epistemology, 
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is accepted as such within a particular socio-historical context collapses (cf. Barnes and 
Bloor 1982, 27).  Scientific knowledge is thus identified with beliefs accepted as 
knowledge at a particular time/interval by the scientific community (or an authoritative 
portion thereof) – that is, opinion accepted as authoritative.  The distinction between 
knowledge and opinion is just the difference between authoritative and non-authoritative 
opinion.  Such a distinction can be drawn for any cognitive enterprise: law, religion, 
government, philosophy, art, etc.  So there is nothing, on a descriptive view, to 
distinguish scientific inquiry from other social practices that involve belief and opinion - 
that is, most human activities.  The descriptive approach therefore fails to explicate the 
distinction between knowledge and opinion in a way that engages our scientific practices.  
It engages, instead, a much broader domain of human social action, within which our 
scientific practices recede into the broader social fabric. Thoroughgoing descriptivism 
effaces the epistemic significance of scientific inquiry.
5
  This approach, on its own, is 
therefore inadequate for social epistemology of scientific inquiry (though it might be 
defended on its own terms as epistemology of human social endeavor).   
 The normative approach is vitiated in a complementary way.  Though epistemic 
ideals such as rationality and objectivity have long been considered characteristic of 
scientific inquiry, their relationship to our actual practices is difficult to specify.  Social 
constructivist critiques of normative epistemology highlight this difficulty.  How can 
epistemic standards distinct from our practices nonetheless exert ‘prescriptive grip’ on 
them?  Is it not less mysterious to dismiss them as pretty fictions to dazzle the uninitiated 
and inspire novices?  This would make normative epistemology “no more than an empty 
play on words or an epistemology of the imagination” (Fleck 1979[1935], 21).  In 
response, normative epistemologists offer case studies of epistemic ideals in scientific 
practice: intuitively clear cases of epistemic success and failure in historical or 
contemporary scientific inquiry are shown to conform to some idealized epistemic 
standard (e.g., Kitcher 1993, 2001).  But such case studies are not a satisfactory rebuttal. 
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Scientific inquiry is not ‘pre-packaged’ into cases for philosophical consumption.  
‘Exogenous’ epistemic ideals engage our actual practices only in conjunction with further 
assumptions specifying which aspects of scientific episodes are epistemically relevant.  
So case studies in normative epistemology show (at best) that an epistemic ideal applies 
to our scientific practices relative to a partition of those practices into epistemically 
relevant and irrelevant aspects.  But this is question-begging.  Normative social 
epistemologists have themselves persuasively argued against the individualistic 
assumption that social aspects of scientific inquiry are epistemically irrelevant (e.g., 
Longino 1990, Kitcher 1993, Kornblith 1994, Goldman 1999, Solomon 2001).  Parallel 
arguments can be made for the social interactions and negotiations that establish 
epistemic standards in actual practice. 
 The descriptive approach presents an incisive challenge for normative 
epistemology of science – not by proving that epistemic standards must be socially 
constructed (as noted above, this is not even an adequate alternative), but by highlighting 
the arbitrary and ad hoc nature of the epistemic relevance relations that underwrite the 
application of ideal epistemic standards to our scientific practices. Many different 
specifications of epistemic relevance are possible, and absent a principled rationale for 
selecting among them the associated epistemic ideals lack normative force for our 
practices.
6
  Application to our scientific practices thus relativizes epistemic ideals to one 
partition among many.  A ‘relevance partitioning principle’ would of course underwrite 
application of ideal epistemic standards to our practices.  But it does not seem that any 
such is available.  Any attempt to identify such a principle will face the same difficulties 
as epistemic ideals themselves.  A priori arguments in support of one partition over 
another cannot settle the matter, since what is at issue is the application of epistemic 
ideals to our practices, not the cogency of those ideals as such.  On the other hand, appeal 
to contemporary acceptance of certain aspects of certain episodes as exemplary concedes 
to descriptivism.  If epistemic ideals apply to our scientific practices only in virtue of our 
acceptance of certain exemplars, then the distinction between epistemic standards and 
local criteria of acceptance collapses in practice.  So, despite the availability of 
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philosophical case studies, ‘exogenous’ epistemic ideals fail to prescribe our scientific 
practices, being relative to an arbitrary distinction, or collapsing into descriptivism.  
 Normative/descriptive dualism thus poses a dilemma for epistemology of 
scientific inquiry: either epistemic standards distinguishing scientific knowledge from 
opinion are dependent on social structures, values or interests, or they are not.  If they are, 
then epistemology collapses into description of socio-historical facts, and scientific 
inquiry recedes into the complex and dynamic pattern of the broader social and cultural 
fabric.  If epistemic standards are independent of social structures, values or interests, 
then epistemology proposes abstract ideals with no clear prescriptive relation to our 
actual practices of scientific inquiry.  What is needed is an epistemic standard that can 
bridge the gap between abstract ideals and our pervasively social scientific practices, to 
yield an adequate epistemology of scientific inquiry.  
 Neither historical nor philosophical case studies (as discussed above) can be of 
help here.  In fact, the dilemma for social epistemology of scientific inquiry is posed by 
these two kinds of case studies.  The descriptive approach is underwritten by studies of 
many different disciplines and historical contexts, which robustly indicate that our 
scientific practices are suffused with social interactions and sociological influences.
7
  
Selection of topics for inquiry, development and implementation of methods and 
evidential standards, and acceptance of scientific claims are all social practices, involving 
multiple individuals and (unavoidably) their various interests.  Further historical case 
studies demonstrating this familiar empirical result are otiose, and (as noted above) 
unmotivated.  Philosophical case studies showing that ‘exogenous’ epistemic ideals apply 
to our scientific practices are vitiated by question-begging assumptions as to which 
aspects of our practice are epistemically relevant.  Another illustration that selected 
aspects of a selected scientific episode conform to an independently-obtaining epistemic 
ideal will not help matters.  Resolving the dilemma requires moving beyond both sorts of 
case study, into a new framework for examining scientific inquiry.   
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Social action framework.  
Philosophy of social action provides a framework that is compatible with both normative 
and descriptive approaches to scientific inquiry, and so of accommodating their diverse 
case studies to one another.  Its core is a thin but robust consensus concerning practical 
reasoning and action, deeply entrenched in everyday and technical explanations of human 
activity, and explicit in recent philosophical accounts of social action.  This is simply that 
human action can be understood and explained in terms of ‘fit’ between goals and means, 
that is, in terms of instrumental rationality.  Appeal to inquirers’ goals and means is 
explicit in Latour’s actor-network theory (1987) and Pickering’s mangle of practice 
(1995).  In Shapin’s interest model (1975), the tie between broad socio-cultural interests 
and inquirers’ goals and means remains partly implicit, yet underwrites the explanatory 
force of these accounts.  Several influential sociological accounts discuss the goals and 
means of individual inquirers in light of ‘the end of science’ conceived as the telos of a 
social structure (Merton, 1973) or the expression of a mood characteristic of a ‘thought-
style’ (Fleck, 1979[1935]).  Others (Collins 1975, Knorr Cetina 1981) focus on the social 
organizations and epistemic practices that structure scientists’ means-end reasoning; the 
latter provides the starting point for such laboratory studies, and is presupposed by them.  
Means-end reasoning underpins the philosophy of political naturalists like Rouse (1996) 
and Fuller (2002), as well as their accounts of scientific inquiry.  The same goes for 
naturalistic epistemologists, such as Hull (1988), Goldman (1999), Kitcher (2001).  The 
goals and means of scientific communities also figure in Solomon’s (2001) and 
Longino’s (2002) social accounts of scientific rationality and knowledge (respectively). 
This widespread commitment to means-end reasoning in explanation and 
understanding of human action entails two constraints on agents’ goals and means so 
understood.  A goal must, at minimum, engage an agent’s motivation such that her 
intentional action may ensue, the latter being subject to assessment in terms of 
instrumental rationality.  To take an action to be a means to a goal is to include it in a 
plan for achieving that goal.  This is not to stipulate that intentions or actions must be 
instrumentally rational, only that they fall within the scope of instrumental rationality, to 
be understood and explained in terms of ‘fit’ between goal and means.  This is a weak 
constraint, but it does rule out: (1) having a goal which cannot be achieved no matter 
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what one does; and (2) taking as means actions that could not be included in a coherent 
plan specifying how one’s goal might be achieved.  These constraints impose two 
necessary (though insufficient) conditions for instrumentally rational action: achievability 
(for goals) and coherence (for means). 
 Recent philosophical accounts of social action extend these minimal 
preconditions for instrumental rationality to activities involving multiple interacting 
participants (Gilbert 1989, Searle 1990, Bratman 1999, Kutz 2000, Miller 2001, Tuomela 
2005).  Though there are deep differences among them, all these accounts endorse the 
idea of a shared goal achieved by multiple participants acting according to their parts.
8
 
For practical reasoning in social action, what is at issue is not what an individual can do, 
but what multiple individuals can accomplish together: a shared goal.  In social as well as 
individual action, an agent is committed to a plan that includes her intended action as a 
part.  What distinguishes participant means from means taken in individual action is that 
the plan necessarily involves others’ actions as well.  This entails an additional 
requirement of coherence: that one’s means be coordinated with those of other 
participants.  Social action is understood and explained in terms of the connection 
between shared goals that participants hope to accomplish together, and the coordinated 
means by which they try to do so.  This entails two requirements: that the shared goal of a 
given social action be achievable, and the means taken to it coordinated among 
participants.  These minimal preconditions for instrumental rationality therefore provide a 
minimal consensus framework, compatible with both normative and descriptive 
perspectives on scientific inquiry.   
Of course, there is nothing about goal-oriented social action subject to constraints 
of instrumental rationality, peculiar to scientific inquiry.  Fleshing out this minimal 
framework requires empirical study of scientific episodes.  I shall focus here on one in 
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particular: the effort to isolate and characterize blood stem cells, an episode of recent 
cellular immunology (Fagan 2007).  
 
Preliminaries  
The search for the blood stem cell (HSC) emerged from the confluence of cell biology, 
genetics and radiation research in the mid-20
th
 century, and coalesced in the early 1960s 
around a new experimental approach: the spleen colony assay.  A notable result in 1988 
led to a developmental turn, with important ramifications for stem cell and cancer 
biology.  Historical study of this episode, focused on shared goals and coordinated means 
of participants, fleshes out the minimal social action framework for a representative 
experimental success.  This is not a philosophical case study illustrating the application of 
an exogenous epistemic ideal for scientific knowledge; I have not proposed any such 
ideal.  Nor is it an historical case study illustrating that epistemic standards change in 
response to changing social structures, interests or values; clearly the evidential standards 
we use do vary and change, but I have not supposed that these are identical to that which 
distinguishes scientific knowledge from opinion.  So my narrative description of this 
episode is not a case study reinforcing the normative/descriptive divide and associated 
dilemma.  It is a case study, if you like, of scientific inquiry in the social action 
framework, but the latter is sufficiently thin to make that a rather trivial point.  It is the 
empirical study within this minimal that yields a substantive result.   
I focus on the HSC episode for three reasons.  First, it is well-suited to examining 
the relation of epistemic standards for scientific knowledge and social aspects of 
scientific practice within a framework of shared goals and coordinated means.  The 
search for HSC exhibits a complex social structure, is explicitly goal-oriented, and is 
recognized by practicing scientists as including several important successes.  In all three 
respects it is typical of contemporary experimental biomedicine.
9
  So the search for HSC 
is a representative episode in which the features of interest for social epistemology of 
scientific inquiry in a social action framework are evident, but not peculiarly exaggerated.   
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My second reason for selecting the HSC episode is methodological.  The 
following descriptive account is based on the published record, interviews with 
participating researchers, and my own experience as a graduate student in the Weissman 
lab (1994-1997).  The last familiarized me with this episode of immunology research, and 
provided access to many of the social interactions involved.  However, I was not directly 
involved in the search for HSC and did not participate in the episode described here.  My 
personal experience with the episode allowed me to use published sources and to obtain 
interviews with participants more efficiently than would have been possible otherwise.  
The account below (a fragment of the entire study) is based on these two sources (see 
Appendix for details).   
Finally, the HSC episode is significant for understanding the history of 
immunology and stem cell research.  Blood-making (‘hematopoietic’) stem cells occupy 
a distinctive role in the immune system and in our understanding of it.  Though diverse 
cells are involved in immune function, all develop from a common precursor type, 
localized (in adults) to bone marrow.
10
  Most blood and immune cells live only a few 
days or weeks, and do not divide with sufficient rapidity to replenish themselves.  But 
one or a few blood stem cells can completely reconstitute an immune system that 
functions over the long-term, continuously dividing into progeny that differentiate into all 
the cells of the immune system.
11
 As the beginning of the developmental history of the 
immune system, HSC provide an inclusive starting point for explaining and 
understanding its diverse mechanisms and our experimental manipulations thereof.
12
 
Examining the epistemic history of HSC research provides an illuminating view of 
immunology more generally.  Furthermore, HSC are the best understood and most 
facilely manipulated of all stem cell types, providing a standard for characterizing other 
stem cells (embryonic, neurogenic, tumorigenic) in clinical and laboratory settings.  
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 This is why bone marrow transplants are clinically effective: to treat leukemias (for example), the entire 
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Tracing the development of evidential standards for isolating HSC and other stem cell 
types thus sheds light on the epistemology of stem cell research more generally.  So my 
criteria for selecting the search for HSC as a representative episode of recent 
experimental science, do not reinforce the dilemma framed by socio-historical and 
philosophical case studies.   
 
Search for HSC 
Though the existence of HSC was inferred in Owen’s 1945 study of blood group genetics 
in bovine twins, the search for these elusive cells began over a decade later.
13
  A key 
interim discovery occurred in 1951,  when radiation biologists observed that lethally-
irradiated mice could be ‘rescued’ by bone marrow transplantation.
14
  High levels of !-
radiation destroy the immune system, which is ordinarily fatal.  But mice given lethal 
doses survive if later injected with bone marrow cells from a ‘donor’ of the same inbred 
strain.  Transplanting bone marrow cells effectively transplanted a functioning immune 
system.  Biomedical researchers noticed the clinical applications, and began to 
systematically investigate ‘radiation rescue’ in mice.  The search for HSC coalesced out 
of this international research program, beginning with a new experimental system: the 
spleen colony assay.   
 The spleen colony assay was invented by medical biophysicists at the Ontario 
Cancer Institute, who noticed that, after about two weeks, ‘rescued’ mice developed 
nodules on their spleens.
15
  Each nodule was found to be a colony or clone descended 
from a single donor bone marrow cell, containing all the known hematopoietic cell types.   
Cells taken from a spleen colony could rescue lethally irradiated mice and produce 
splenic colonies in their turn.  These three capacities of colony-forming cells were taken 
                                                
13
 Owen observed that many bovine fraternal twins had identical blood types, though ‘untwinned’ full 
siblings rarely did.  He explained these curious results as due to exchange of blood cells between fraternal 
twins by vascular fusions in utero.  Since blood samples were taken from adults, Owen’s explanation 
implied that embryonic events influence the phenotypes of blood cells circulating years later.  However, 
cell physiologists had shown that cell lineages founded by “formed erythrocytes” had short life spans of 
days or weeks (Jordan 1942). Owen concluded that “embryonal cells ancestral to the erythrocytes of the 
adult animal… are apparently capable of becoming established in the hemapoietic tissues of their co-twin 
hosts and continuing to provide a source of blood cells distinct from those of the host, presumably 
throughout his life” (401).  He did not, however, pursue this hypothesis.  
14
 Lorenz et al (1951).  
15
 Till and McCulloch (1961), Becker et al (1963), Siminovitch et al (1963). 
 11 
to define HSC: (1) radiation rescue by reconstituting the immune system; (2) 
multipotency, differentiation into multiple blood cell types; and (3) self-renewal, 
maintaining these capacities far longer than the life span of a single blood cell.  HSC so 
defined could be detected only in retrospect, after these capacities had been realized.  
They were rare cells; less than 0.1% of bone marrow in adult mice.  At this point the 
experimental goal became clear: prospectively enrich bone marrow cell preparations for 
HSC, using the spleen colony assay to measure enrichment.  
 This goal was shared mainly by hematologists, medically-trained experts on blood 
cells.  About a dozen research groups took up the project in the mid-1960s (including the 
inventors of the spleen colony assay).  Though in competition, these groups met regularly 
to share results and methods.  The social structure of this stage of the search for HSC is 
concisely represented in a participant summary from one such meeting (in 1968, Figure 
1).  The different groups shared a core experimental method, a standard for measuring 
HSC enrichment (top).  Representatives of the main groups are associated with diverse 
variations on this core method (below).  The aim of the meeting, and others like it, was to 
pool and compare the results of different variations on the spleen colony assay.  Through 
such interactions, the different lab groups formed a more inclusive group, with the shared 
goal of prospectively isolating HSC.  The search for HSC proceeded by division of labor: 
each group used a somewhat different method, and results were pooled and compared at 
regular meetings to assemble a comprehensive consensus.
16
  Experimental protocols 
lengthened, as methods of enrichment were concatenated.
17
  By the mid-1980s, the 
community had made considerable progress – up to 200-fold enrichment of HSC from 
mouse bone marrow (Visser et al 1984).  This was the state of play when the search was 
abruptly transformed.  
The transformative event was a widely-publicized announcement by the 
Weissman lab at Stanford University in 1988 that the search for HSC in mice was over – 
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murine HSC had been purified and characterized (Spangrude et al 1988).
18
  This result 
(two decades in the making) emerged from a distinct line of research that differed in three 
important ways from the hematological search for HSC.  First, the shared core of the 
Weissman group’s search was not an experimental system, but the shared goal of 
characterizing mechanisms of immune cell development in terms of surface phenotype, 
movement and function of single cells.  Second, being uncommitted to any particular 
experimental method, the Weissman group made opportunistic use of whatever new 
techniques were available.  In particular, they enjoyed early access to fluorescence-
activated cell sorting technology (developed at Stanford in the Herzenberg laboratory) as 
paying members of a ‘shared FACS users group.’
19
  Third, instead of dispersed division 
of labor, the lab served as a center for continuous and cumulative collaboration in the 
search for HSC.  Research interests within the lab were diverse, and its shifting 
membership was free to pursue whatever project they chose.  The result was a loose and 
shifting assemblage of lines of inquiry, many of which concerned blood cell 
development.   
In the early 1980s, three such projects were coordinated into a focused search for 
HSC.  Three kinds of interaction were crucial for this search: multiple collaborations 
within the Weissman lab, participation in Stanford’s shared FACS users’ group, and a 
collaboration with a West German laboratory.  The upshot was a cell labeling and 
tracking experiment that characterized and isolated a cell population 2,000-fold enriched 
for HSC function.  This was the result announced in 1988, published in Science 
(Spangrude et al 1988).  Though the paper had only three authors, the result depended on 
decades of sustained collaboration involving dozens of researchers, in and outside the 
Weissman lab.  Initially controversial, the Weissman group’s result is now recognized as 
a significant contribution to modern immunology; a representative biomedical success.   
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However, their success did not consist of isolation of HSC, nor even greater 
enrichment of HSC from mouse bone marrow.  Methodological diversity among the 
hematologists yielded divergent assessments of how the Weissman group’s result 
compared to earlier work, preventing clear consensus among those most concerned with 
this issue.
20
  Arguably, the Weissman group did not improve on extant HSC purification 
protocols.  Divergent assessments of the issue persist today.  Moreover, within a year all 
interested parties had agreed that the Weissman group’s cell population was 
heterogeneous, and various groups (including Weissman’s) began working to 
characterize more finely-grained cell populations.
21
  So the success of 1988 certainly did 
not consist in the isolation of a pure blood stem cell, and arguably, not even of HSC 
enrichment relative to other available methods.  
What it did consist of was, first, articulation of a new model of blood cell 
development coordinating HSC capacities with cell phenotype; and second, a new 
direction and impetus for the search for HSC as a project of cellular immunology.   Both 
resulted from distinctive features of the Weissman group’s search for HSC.  As noted 
above, the hematological HSC research community proceeded by aggregating the results 
of different groups working to isolate it.  Their methods were diverse, not coordinated by 
a single model of cell development or physiology.  In contrast, the Weissman group 
coordinated the defining capacities of HSC with cell surface characteristics at the single-
cell level, in a way that readily extended to humans and to other developmental stages.  
This amounted to an improved model of the development and function of the immune 
system, and (via developmental analogy) gestured toward future clinical applications.
22
  
This result fit with the biomedical goal of immumology: knowledge of the immune 
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or in vitro colony formation, while the Weissman group defined HSC in terms of the correlation between in 
vitro colony formation and in vivo immune reconstitution.  The resulting divergent assessments of the 1988 
result persist today.  Within the Weissman lab, the 10-fold greater enrichment was and is recognized as 
success. 
21
 Lemischka et al (1986); Visser, in Radetsky (1995, 91); Spangrude (1989, interview of 12/4/2006); 
Müller-Sieburg (interview of 4/6/2007). 
22
 ‘Model’ is the term used by HSC researchers, and, increasingly, by philosophers of science as a 
generalization of ‘theory,’ which admits non-linguistic representations as well as more traditional theories 
amenable to axiomatic presentation (e.g., Giere 1988, Longino 2002).  Models in this sense are 
representations of subjects of inquiry, in which mathematical laws or idealized causal or formal relations 
are satisfied.  Theories may be thought of as ‘families’ of models and associated similarity claims. 
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system and treatment of infectious disease, autoimmune disorders, and cancers (Paul 
1983, Kuby 1995, Paul 2003).  The tie to cellular developmental immunology gave new 
direction and impetus to the field of HSC research.  The widely-publicized Science paper 
created a new interface between previously distinct lines of inquiry.  Controversy then 
ensued over their different methods and standards for isolating HSC.  Yet the occasion of 
this controversy became the most enduring aspect of the Weissman group’s success.  The 
1988 model itself was superseded within a year, but the Weissman group’s distinctive 
method (coordinating surface phenotype with developmental potential and immune 
function at the single-cell level) was emulated and modified by many other groups, and 
the search for HSC drew on rapid advances in cellular immunology throughout the 1990s.  
The two aspects of success were interdependent: announcement of the coordinated model 
precipitated the interface of experimental hematology and developmental immunology, 
and the standards according to which that model counted as improved emerged from that 
interface, endorsed by the more inclusive HSC community. 
Other successes followed: further refinement of bone marrow cells by self-
renewal capacity (Morrison and Weissman 1994), reconciling apparently incompatible 
models of blood cell development (Kawamoto et al 1997, Kondo et al 1997), and 
ramifications of HSC research for stem cell and cancer biology, realized in new interfaces 
between these fields (Dontu et al 2003).  Continued pursuit of HSC led in turn to further 
new interfaces with neurobiology, developmental biology, evolutionary biology, and 
cancer research.  Concomitantly, models of blood cell development became increasingly 
robust and detailed (Figure 2).  In these various ramifications of the search for HSC, two 
aspects of success are robustly recognized by participating researchers: improved models 
of cell development, and coordination of groups or individuals with different goals.  This 
pattern recurs at different levels of social organization: within a single lab, among 
different lab groups, and across fields and disciplines.   
 
Scientific success.   
Two aspects of the 1988 success can be distinguished: construction of an improved 
model of blood cell development, and formation of fruitful new interfaces between 
distinct lines of inquiry.  Both are coordinations: of HSC function and cell phenotype in 
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an improved model of blood cell development, and, at the social level, of the search for 
HSC with other successful lines of inquiry.  As noted above, this pattern of recognized 
success recurs throughout the episode, at different levels of social organization.  This 
recurring pattern is also seen in other episodes of experimental inquiry, including those 
described in influential science studies texts: Boyle’s experiments with the air-pump, 
isolation and characterization of thyrotropin releasing factor (hormone) at the Salk 
Institute, gravitational wave research in Italy and the US, Pasteur’s anthrax vaccine, the 
Wassermann test for syphilis.
23
  So diverse socio-historical case studies indicate that this 
pattern of recognized scientific success (improved models, and new interfaces) is robust 
across various disciplines and historical contexts.  This is, of course, a robust empirical 
result, not a normative thesis about scientific success.   
Yet this descriptive schema also displays some kinship with normative epistemic 
ideals.  Models
24
 are recognized as improved when they increase the scope, consistency, 
precision or accuracy of scientific accounts of the empirical world.  Coordination of 
diverse lines of inquiry via new interfaces similarly recalls epistemic virtues long 
identified with scientific knowledge: consistency, coherence and unification.
25
  However, 
it will not do to simply identify epistemic ideals with the two aspects of success.  Models 
are improved relative to epistemic standards of groups, which vary widely over time and 
across fields, and in response to social interactions and structures.  Formation of new 
interfaces is a highly contingent matter, influenced by available technology, world events, 
                                                
23
 Shapin and Shaffer (1985, 3-7, 30-31), Shapin (1996, 96); Latour and Woolgar (1979, 106); Collins 
(1998, 299), Latour (1983, 260-264), Fleck (1979[1935], 14-19).    
24
 Models in science represent parts of the world under investigation in particular respects and degrees, 
which vary depending on available techniques and the purposes for which those models are constructed.  
Techniques and purposes, in turn, vary widely across disciplines, fields, and socio-historical contexts.  
Improvements to a model strengthen or extend the similarity claims associated with it, according to the 
standards of the relevant research community. 
25
 New interfaces between distinct lines of inquiry can arise in three ways: a single line of inquiry divides 
into two (or more) distinct branches; two distinct lines of inquiry merge to become one; and two distinct 
lines of inquiry remain distinct, but alter their relation to one another.  All three are a means to (though not 
a guarantee of) greater consistency, coherence or unification of scientific knowledge.  Division of a single 
line of inquiry into two disambiguates the goals and means at work within a line of inquiry, reconciling 
inconsistencies between apparently incompatible models and thereby organizing inquiry more efficiently.  
Merging of two distinct lines of inquiry to form a new, more inclusive group is, roughly speaking, the 
converse of division of labor.  The subject matter of distinct lines of inquiry is seen to connect, such that 
models previously thought unrelated are seen as relevant to one another.  Conflict and controversy ensue, 
precisely because of the new connection; coordination is achieved (at least in some cases) via these 
apparently antagonistic social interactions.  Lines of inquiry are then seen as more coherently organized, 
contributing via different roles to a larger project with a more inclusive shared goal. 
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and mere coincidences as well as the (often unexpected) results of lines of inquiry 
themselves.  So the way in which epistemic ideals of consistency, coherence and 
unification are cashed out in any particular new interface depends on many 
contingencies, as well as the standards for evaluation of models accepted by the groups in 
question. 
 The social action framework captures this indirect relation: the two aspects of 
success are participant means to the shared epistemic goal of scientific inquiry, scientific 
knowledge.  That is, recognized successes (improved models and new interfaces) are seen 
as contributions to scientific knowledge: provisional, partial, and unavoidably enmeshed 
in human social interactions, yet all directed toward a further end.  The social action 
framework accommodates normative and descriptive approaches to social epistemology 
of scientific inquiry without identifying scientific knowledge with the outcome of 
successful scientific episodes, nor dismissing as irrelevant the socially-enmeshed 
epistemic standards used in actual scientific episodes.  The task now is to specify this end 
or shared goal, using the results of empirical study of our scientific practices.  One such 
result (generalizing from the HSC episode) is that the two aspects of success are 
coordinated in our scientific practice.  Models count as improved according to the 
epistemic standards of some particular group pursuing a line of inquiry.  These standards 
are unavoidably enmeshed in that group’s socio-cultural context.  Models meeting the 
standards of different lines of inquiry are brought into critical contact by formation of 
new interfaces between research groups.  New epistemic goals and standards for their 
achievement are then negotiated.  Models that satisfy standards of improvement in one 
context are thus given critical scrutiny from a new (though not wholly unrelated) 
perspective.  And so on, as inquiry continues.  The two aspects of success are thus 
coordinated means for ongoing successful inquiry – iterations of model-construction and 
interface-formation.  
 
Scientific objectivity.  
Having characterized these means by socio-historical study of scientific practice, we can 
now ask: what must the shared goal of our scientific practices be like, given the means 
taken to it?  Here the minimal requirements for social action come into play.  Recall that 
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these are preconditions for conceiving scientific inquiry in terms of instrumental 
rationality.
26
  If scientific practices can be understood and evaluated in terms of 
instrumental rationality, then they have a shared goal that is achievable by coordinated 
participant means: construction of improved models and coordination of lines of inquiry 
via new interfaces.  Historians, sociologists and philosophers of science, as well as 
scientists themselves, do try to understand scientific inquiry in this way (as well as 
others).  So these requirements, though minimal, have quite broad prescriptive force.  
Applied to the descriptive account of scientific success in the social action framework, 
these minimal constraints on social action explicate the distinction between scientific 
knowledge and opinion.  
Scientific knowledge, the shared goal of our scientific practices, must be 
achievable by the coordinated means taken to it.  There is of course no guarantee of 
success, nor can a comprehensive plan be detailed.  One reason for this is that formation 
of new interfaces between distinct lines of inquiry is highly contingent, as is the 
negotiation of new epistemic standards brought into critical contact thereby.  A 
consequence of this socially-enmeshed contingency is that the pattern of formation of 
new interfaces cannot be specified in advance.  If formation of new interfaces is 
unpredictable in advance, then the epistemic standards resulting from such new interfaces 
are likewise unpredictable.  So the standards to which a successful model will be held 
accountable cannot be specified in advance.   
The minimal constraints on instrumentally rational social action require that 
shared epistemic goal of scientific inquiry be achievable by the interplay of construction 
of improved models and formation of new interfaces, where the epistemic standards 
successful models must satisfy cannot be specified in advance.  That is, scientific 
knowledge (conceived as the aim of inquiry) must be such as to possibly result from the 
coordinated means taken to it.  So scientific knowledge must be such as to possibly 
satisfy epistemic standards not specifiable in advance.  This is, admittedly, a very thin 
characterization of scientific knowledge, but it suffices to rule out ‘knowledge by 
agreement’ as the goal of scientific inquiry.   
                                                
26
 This is not to say that scientific inquiry is instrumentally rational; only that it may be understood and 
evaluated in these terms  (i.e., the fit between goals and means).  This account is neutral as to further 
requirements for instrumental rationality and epistemic variants of same.   
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Knowledge that is so only in virtue of the epistemic standards of specifiable 
groups in particular socio-historical contexts, is not an achievable shared goal of our 
scientific practices.  So the epistemic standards distinguishing scientific knowledge from 
opinion are not identical to the epistemic standards accepted within particular socio-
historical contexts (if we suppose that our scientific practices can be understood in terms 
of fit between goals and means).  This is an important (negative) result.  One can grant 
that our scientific practices are pervasively social, and indeed that social interactions are 
necessary for epistemic success in all but the most fragmentary and circumscribed 
episodes of scientific inquiry, without identifying scientific knowledge with authoritative 
opinion in particular contexts.  
Put more positively, this result specifies the ideal of scientific objectivity in 
relation to our scientific practices.  Our scientific practices, conceived as social action 
satisfying prerequisites for instrumental rationality, aim at knowledge that is so in virtue 
of satisfying epistemic standards that are not limited to any specifiable group.  Such 
knowledge is ‘objective’ in a sense long associated with the epistemic distinctiveness of 
scientific inquiry, but hotly contested in recent studies of science (e.g., Longino 1990, 
Daston and Galison 1992, Boghossian 2006).  Objective knowledge, in this sense, is 
knowledge independent of the opinions of any single individual or group of individuals.  
In the terminology used here, that anyone (or any specifiable group) accepts a model as 
scientific knowledge does not make it so.  The relevant epistemic standard does not 
depend on features specific or idiosyncratic to particular groups of inquirers (and, a 
fortiori, individual inquirers).   
This result is not to be confused with an analysis of the concept of objectivity.  It 
is, rather, an explication of an epistemic ideal implicit in our scientific practices, brought 
out by framing descriptive socio-historical narratives of scientific inquiry in terms of 
social action theory.  This conception of scientific objectivity is normative, in two senses.  
First, it is required for understanding scientific inquiry in terms of means-end reasoning.  
Second, it specifies an epistemic ideal that allows for principled epistemic evaluation of 
our scientific practices.  To be sure, this thin conception of scientific objectivity does not 
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allow for all the epistemological critique of science one might want.
27
  It is, rather, a 




Conclusion.   
This account of scientific objectivity bridges the gap between social aspects of scientific 
practice, on the one hand, and epistemic ideals of scientific knowledge, on the other.  It 
does so by moving beyond the historical and philosophical case studies that frame the 
original dilemma.  My account moves beyond historical case studies of the social aspects 
of scientific inquiry by embedding them in a social action framework that entails minimal 
normative requirements.  Descriptive socio-historical accounts in turn yield a robust two-
part account of scientific success that approximates traditional epistemic ideals of 
scientific knowledge.  This two-part account of scientific success unifies diverse socio-
historical case studies of scientific inquiry and so characterizes participant means to the 
shared epistemic goal of these practices.  The minimal constraints for social action then 
specify the epistemic ideal of scientific objectivity.  So my account also goes beyond 
philosophical case studies illustrating the application of an ‘exogenous’ epistemic ideal.  
Here the problem of principled application to our scientific practices simply does not 
arise.  Instead, the distinction between scientific knowledge and opinion is explicated by 
engaging with the social aspects of our scientific practices from the outset.  The resulting 
epistemic ideal of scientific objectivity validates normative epistemology of scientific 
inquiry and provides a starting point for elaborating further social epistemic norms.  So it 
may play a grounding and framing role for philosophical case studies of scientific inquiry 
as well.  I have not attempted such an expansion here, however.  I have, instead, focused 
on the dilemma for social epistemology of scientific inquiry posed by 
                                                
27
 It is not, however, toothless.  For example: Intelligent Design; the entanglement of science and business 
interests; and ‘imperialism’ among the sciences.  The Intelligent Design movement (considered as a line of 
inquiry rather than an educational policy) is not science because its proponents fail to participate in 
scientific inquiry (new interfaces with evolutionary research do not form) and do not share its goal (the 
knowledge ID aims at conforms to the convictions of a specifiable, idiosyncratic group).  Associations 
between scientific inquiry and business interests raise epistemological concerns; my account provides a 
principled way of sorting problematic from unproblematic entanglements (emphasizing constraints on 
formation of new interfaces).  Finally, among the sciences, attempts at ‘disciplinary takeover’ or sweeping 
assertions of hegemony are diagnosed as epistemically problematic (impeding formation of new interfaces). 
28
 For example, Longino’s social epistemic norms for reliable empirical knowledge (or something very like 
them) could be grounded by this minimal account (1990, 2002). 
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normative/descriptive dualism: epistemic standards distinguishing scientific knowledge 
from mere opinion either fail to engage our actual social practices, or collapse into 
description of socio-historical facts.  I have outlined a way out of this dilemma that 
integrates history and philosophy of science.  It is through understanding our scientific 
practices as social action that we gain purchase on epistemic ideals of our scientific 
inquiry, rather than idealized abstractions.  
 
Appendix: Interview methods  
Interviews aimed to identify and characterize social interactions recognized by 
participants as crucial in the search for HSC; and to reveal participants’ attitudes toward 
these interactions (see below for details).  Specifically, I sought to understand how 
interviewees conceived of their research activities in relation to those of other scientific 
inquirers, within and among laboratories and research communities, and the impact of 
these interactions (if any) on achievement of research goals.  The inteviewees were: 
Laurie Ailles (Institute for Stem Cell Biology and Regenerative Medicine, Stanford); 
Robert Coffman (Dynavax Technologies, Berkeley); George Gutman (University of 
California, Irvine); Leonore Herzenberg (Stanford University); Libuse Jerabek (Stanford 
University); Motonari Kondo (Duke University); Sean Morrison (University of 
Michigan); Jerry Spangrude (University of Utah); Christa Müller-Sieburg (Sidney 
Kimmel Cancer Institute, La Jolla); and Irving Weissman (Stanford University).  
Interviewees were selected to provide a range of perspectives on the search for HSC.  All 
but one (Herzenberg) are or were at one time members of the Weissman lab.  Their 
periods of involvement with the search for HSC range from 2-3 years to more than three 
decades, and from the late 1960s to the present day.  Interviewees’ scientific roles in the 
episode include: graduate student, laboratory manager, medical student, post-doctoral 
fellow, principal investigator, and technician.  Their subsequent career trajectories also 
vary widely, and include academic research, clinical research, and industry.  The 
description emerging from these multiple interviews is therefore robust to these different 
participants’ perspectives and roles.   
To allow participants’ attitudes to emerge, rather than imposing my own 
assumptions in the form of leading questions, I used the methodology of qualitative 
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research interviewing.  See Merton et al (1956), Briggs (1986), Seidman (1998); 
Zuckerman (1977) and Gerson (1998) on strategies for interviewing scientists in 
particular.  Interviews focused on the search for HSC, and tended to proceed 
chronologically; otherwise discussion was unstructured, and ranged in duration from 75 
minutes to two hours.  Interview guides and biographies were prepared in advance for 
each subject.  During interviews, “probe notes” were taken as reference points to 
facilitate returning to key events and attitudes (Gorden 1980).  Interviews took place 
during visits to subjects’ laboratories, and were supplemented by one or more of the 
following: a tour of laboratory facilities, further informal discussions with lab personnel, 
and attendance of the weekly lab meeting.  These laboratory visits contextualized the 
taped interviews in two ways.  First, they provided information about interviewees’ 
current setting and style of working, and framed their attitudes toward past interactions in 
terms of contemporary roles and projects.  Second, these engagements with interviewees’ 
current working environment provided an opportunity to discuss the relation between the 
search for HSC and their current projects, eliciting interviewees’ attitudes toward 
scientific success over time.  Both were important for framing and interpreting the taped 
interviews. 
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